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The primary focus of this thesis is an attempt to show
that President Bush's New World Order reflects enduring
currents in U.S. foreign policy. This assessment is
undertaken through delineating, examining and evaluating three
major "schools" of thought which have influenced American
foreign policy. The three "schools" are isolationism, realism
and idealism. The assessment of these schools of thought is
based on an examination of critical writings of leading
architects, practitioners and specialists of American foreign
policy. The thesis seeks to suggest that these schools are
constantly interacting in American politics, and constantly
seeking to capture the dynamic of American foreign policy.
Thus, the major objective of the thesis is to delineate these
schools, indicating their impact on particular American
policies and relating them to the evolution of American
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I . INTRODUCTION
The foundation of the United States was built upon the
principle of "We the People." President Lincoln stood on a
battlefield and stated: "This nation, under God, shall have
a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by
the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." 1
President Bush has recently reiterated this principle when he
said: "Since the birth of our nation, 'We the People,' has
been the source of our strength. What government can do alone
is limited, but the potential of the American people knows no
limits." 2 "We the People," is more than a motto, it is a
foundation for American foreign policy.
Every presidential administration, from Washington to
Bush, has had different views on how to handle foreign policy.
However, one underlining theme has been constant under many
presidents since 1860: universal human rights and how to
represent that policy to the world. To Americans, democracy
and freedom are something that should be shared by every
country. Irving Kristol stated: "Those who make American
foreign policy will di scover--that any viable conception of
the United States's 'national interest' cannot help but be
organically related to that public phi losophy-- i deology , which
Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin, ed., Speeches of
the American Presidents (The H.W. Wilson, Company, New York,
1988), 193.
George Bush, "State of the Union," Vital Speeches
of the Day 57, 9, (February 15, 1991): 259.
1




While fighting for democracy, "we need only continue
doing what we have done since the beginning." 4 President Bush
stated at Aspen, Colorado that he needed; "A policy .
every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our
interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of
conflict and Cold War." 5 But we cannot foresee the exact form
of the new global politics or the new problems heading in our
directions. "Rather than withdraw into ourselves, we ought
to press ahead with what has brought us this success— the
advancement of the democratic idea. First, America is a great
force for good in the world. Second, what is good for
democracy is good for America." 6
A "foreign policy is the face a nation wears to the
world." 7 Besides, "the American people are entitled to a
foreign policy that seeks to preserve and increase their
living standards, and to one that contributes to their sense
Irving Kristol, "Foreign Policy in an Age of
Ideology," The National Interest , (Fall 1985): 14-15.
4 Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling
America's Destiny
.
(The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1991),
221 .
President Bush's address at Aspen, Colorado on 2
August 1990, 2.
6 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 222.
Arthur Schlesinger, "Foreign Policy and the American
Character." Foreign Affairs , 62, 1, (Fall 1983): 1.
of national pride." 8
As a major Congressional foreign policy leader recently
stated. "The United States is now the world's only
superpower. Our leadership remains essential to world peace
and prosperity." 9 If there is a new world order it will Pe
the United States that will create this new world order. 10
The phrase "new world order" belongs to President Bush
who borrowed it from Mikhail Gorbachev. Several President's
have used phrases or mottos that were their rhetorical
legacies. For example, Theodore Roosevelt- "The New
Nationalism"; Wilson-"The New Freedom"; FDR-"The New Deal";
Kennedy-"The New Frontier"; Reagan-"The New Federalism" and
Bush-"The New World Order." President Bush would like the New
World Order to be as much his legacy as the New Deal is
FDR's. 11 What are the guidelines of Bush's New World Order?
President Bush has given the following guidance:
About the prospects of a new world order now
within our reach. For more than four decades we've
lived in a world divided, East from West; a world
locked in a conflict of arms and ideas called the
Cold War. Two systems, two superpowers, separated
by mistrust and unremitting hostility.
Alan Tonelson, "The Real National Interest," Forei gn
Pol icy , 61 (Winter 1985/86): 69.
Lee H. Hamilton, "Redirecting American Foreign
Policy," Vital Speeches of the Day , 57, 14, (May 1, 1991):
419-420.
Charles Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," The
New Republic
, (July 29, 1991): 27.
Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," 26.
3
For more than four decades, America's energies
were focused on containing the threat to the free
world from the forces of communism. That war is
over. East Germany has vanished from the map as a
separate entity ... we saw the possibilities of
a new order in which nations worked together to
promote peace and prosperity.
The new world order does not mean surrendering
our national sovereignty or forfeiting our
interests. It refers to new ways of working with
other nations to deter aggression and to achieve
stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to
achieve peace.
It springs from hopes for a world based on a
shared commitment among nations large and small, to
a set of principles that undergird our relations.
Peaceful settlements of disputes , solidarity against
aggression, reduced and control led arsenals , and
just treatment of all peoples.
The new world order really is a tool for
addressing a new world of possibilities. This order
gains its mission and shape not just from shared
interests, but from shared ideals. And the ideals
that have spawned new freedoms throughout the world
have received their boldest and clearest expression
in our great country the United States. Never
before have so many millions drawn hope from the
American idea. And the reason is simple: Unlike
any other nation in the world, as Americans, we
enjoy profound and mysterious bonds of affection
and i deal ism.
What makes us American is our allegiance to an
idea that all people everywhere must be free. This
idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself.
The new world facing us, is a wonderful world
of discovery. A world devoted to unlocking the
promise of freedom. 12
Is Bush saying anything new or is he simply repeating or
rephrasing foreign policy ideals and principles that have
always been important to the "American way of life"? The four
principles in italics have consistently been part of American
George Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order,
Vital Speeches of the Day . 57, 15, (May 15, 1991): 451-452
Italics added.
foreign policy. If America wants stability and tranquillity
in the world, the United States will have to work for it.
This new world order will come only from active United States
participation, if not direction, in shaping it. 13 It is a new
world order that calls for a new focus on American foreign
policy, 14 one based on promise's of morality and universal
human rights.
As the world is now changing, the United States must be
an active part of that change, in a way that the United States
leads the future of the world in a re-shaping process.
America has won the cold war. 15 But, America must be careful.
Over twenty-five years ago, President Kennedy cautioned: "We
must face the fact that the United States is neither
omnipotent nor omniscient . . . that we cannot right every
wrong or reverse each adversi ty-and that therefore there
cannot be an American solution to every world problem." 16
Americans are not the policemen of the world nor should
they take on that responsibility. What America can do, is to
take Franklin D. Roosevelt's suggestion: "In the simplest
terms, this is the argument for a policy different from that
of the past . . . most of our history shows us to have been
Krauthammer, "The Lonely Superpower," 26.
14 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American
Presi dents , 721 .
15 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 1.
Arthur Schlesinger, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs , 66, 2, (Winter 1987/88): 280.
a nation leading others in the slow upward steps to better
international and peaceful settlement of disagreements . . .
. The time is ripe to start another chapter." 17 That chapter
may be the new world order, an order built on old ideals and
principles-of democracy, freedom and human rights.
The primary focus of this thesis is an attempt to show
that the four principles in President Bush's New World Order
reflect an enduring current in U. S. foreign policy ideals
across administrations throughout this century. This
assessment will be undertaken through delineating, examining
and evaluating three major "schools" of thought which have
influenced American foreign policy. The schools are
isolationism, realism and idealism. 18 The assessment of those
schools of thought is based on an examination of critical
writings of leading architects, practitioners and specialists
of America foreign policy.
The thesis seeks to suggest that these schools are
constantly interacting in American politics, and constantly
seeking to capture the dynamic of American foreign policy.
Thus, the major objective of the thesis, is to delineate these
schools, indicating their impact on particular American
policies and relating them to the evolution of American
17 Paul Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," in Alexander
DeConde, ed., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies
of the Principal Movements and Ideas , (Charles Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1978): 856.
18 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 13.
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thought to date as expressed in the ideals of the New World
Order. In particular the thesis emphasizes how each school
of thought impacted two enduring American concerns: morality
in foreign policy and universal human rights issues.
Specifically, the thesis seeks to answer the following
questions: 1) How does each school conceptualize the foreign
policy system? 2) What role does each school play in
forecasting the two main issues in foreign policy? 3) How
effective has each school been in influencing American public
opinion? And finally, 4) How effective has each school been
in implementing its preferred vision?
II. THREE SCHOOLS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The three most powerful currents in American foreign
policy are isolationism, realism, and idealism. 19 This chapter
will describe the three schools of thought in more detail.
To do so, a sample of representatives writers has been
selected for each of the three schools of thought. The works
of these authors will be examined in order to bring out the
key points of isolationism, realism and idealism.
A. ISOLATIONISM
President Washington's Farewell Address of 1796, is a
classic statement of an isolationist policy.
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to
foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial
relations to have with them as little political
connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of
primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in
frequent controversies, the causes of which are
essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary
vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or
enmities. Our detached and distant situation
invites and enables us to pursue a different course.
The different course Washington advised was to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
19 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 12. He has
identified four major currents in American foreign policy:
isolationism, realism, pacifist idealism, and democratic
idealism. Under idealism, pacifist idealism is included
for information purposes only as a short historical
background. For the purpose of this thesis, other than the
historical background, pacifist idealism and democratic




the foreign world, so far . . . as we are now at
liberty to do it and to safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies. 20
When Washington advised his countrymen to steer clear of
permanent alliances, his prescription was party motivated by
the fact that there were virtually no other democracies in the
world. America was among the first, and there was good reason
to be careful of entanglements with countries that did not
share America's democratic principles. 21 President
Washington's concern was also motivated by geography:
America's greatest asset in foreign affairs is geographic
isolation. 22 This geographical separation to a large extent




Since the days of Washington, isolation has remained one
of the main currents in American foreign policy. Although
the term "isolationism" is today most commonly associated with
the interwar years, Osgood has pointed out that "the
isolationism of the thirties was distinguished from the
isolationism of other periods not by the number of its
20 Robert W. Tucker, A New Isolationism: Threat or
Promi se?
,
(Potomac Associates, Universe Books, New York,
1972), 25.
21 George P. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of
Thinking," Foreign Affairs , 63, 4, (Spring 1985): 710.
22 Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy: Beyond
Utopianism and Realism
.
(Appleton Century Crofts, Meredith
Publishing Company, New York, 1966), 23.




adherents but by the number of its opponents." 24
Throughout the twentieth century, the three schools of
thought, have exercised there presence during specific time
periods. Thus, as World War I approached, isolationism began
to surface. Most Americans wanted to avoid being drawn into
the European conflict. 25 In 1915, at Philadelphia, President
Wilson stated that "... America must be a special example.
The example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but
of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence
of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a
man being too proud to fight." 26 Later in 1916, he further
stated, "I shall do everything within my power to keep the
United States out of war." 27
However, America was drawn into World War I. America's
entry into that war was not overwhelmingly accepted by the
American people. Reluctant to be drawn into European
conflicts, the American public reinforced congressional
determination not to accept Wilson's big push for the League
24 Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in
America's Foreign Relations , (The University of Chicago Press,
Illinois, 1953), 364, as cited in Muravchik, Exporting
Democracy , 1 4
.
Howard R. Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-
Isolationism on Military Policy," (Essay, Army War College,
Pennsylvania, 1974), 5.
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American
Presidents , 386.
Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-Isolationi sm on




President Wilson made the following statement in support
of the League of Nations. "The isolation of the United States
is at an end, not because we chose to go into the politics of
the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and
the growth of our power we have become a determining factor
in the history of mankind, and after you have become a
determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you
want to or not . " 28
However, the American people were not ready to foresake
isolationism. As a result, the United States rejected the
Treaty of Versailles with its League of Nations, and returned
to the isolationism of the 19th century, along with rejecting
i nterventioni sm almost entirely. 29 "It is only between the
wars that we went from a status of being isolated to a policy
of being isolationist." 30
The interwar period was characterized as isolationist
for American foreign policy. However, Americans were
criticized for failing to realize that national "security
could be guaranteed through military preparedness and
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of the American
Presidents , 407-408.
Trenkle, "The Implications of Neo-Isolationi sm on
Mi 1 i tary Pol icy , " 5 .





political commitments." 31 This claim was made by the
realists. Realists further claimed that policy makers
disregarded the essential elements of power politics and had
been guided ". . . by a politically ignorant and irresponsible
moral impulsiveness, a Utopian view of the problems of
mitigating international conflict and a blind aversion to war
and the instruments of war as absolute evils. . . .
"
32
Nevertheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:
"despite what happens in continents overseas, the United
States of America shall and must remain, as long ago the
Father of our Country prayed that it might remain--unentangled
and free . " 33
Despite the fluctuations of isolationism, the
isolationists in pre-World War II period generally repeated
the arguments and theories of 1914-1917. They "believed that
American intervention in the first World War had been a
tragedy;" and "there should not be a second such tragedy" with
31 Melvyn P. Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic
Expansionism, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy Toward
Western Europe 1921-1933," Perspectives in American History ,
8, (1974), 413.
32 Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in
America's Foreign Relations , 362, as cited in Leffler,
"Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, or Diplomatic
Real ism, " 413.
33 Alexander DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century
Isolationism," in Alexander DeConde, ed , Isolation and
Security , (Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina,
1957) , 11.
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the second World War. 34
Isolationism of the 1940's and the 1950's differed from
that of the prewar years. "Instead of opposing involvement
in war or membership into international organizations," it
welcomed the opportunity to flow into these channels. 35 For
example, isolationists welcomed the opportunity to be part of
the United Nations and the Korean conflict.
Before the Presidential election in 1952, Dwight D.
Eisenhower stated: "that isolationism in America is dead as
a political issue." In 1957, at "his second inaugural
address, President Eisenhower said the mutual dependence of
nations 'makes isolation an impossibility. ... No nation can
longer be a fortress, lone and strong and safe. And any
people, seeking such shelter for themselves, can now build
only their own prison.'" 36
During this period of the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and even
1970s isolationism was in a dormant state. The main reason
for this dormant state stems from heightened American concerns
with the spread of communism and the growth of Soviet power.
The 1940s and 1950s lead to a major change in world politics
as America knew it. The start of the Cold War and the fear
of nuclear warfare relegated isolationism and allowed the
realists school to take command of America's foreign policy.
34 DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 21.
DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 25.
DeConde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism," 32.
13
Now, after forty-five years, there appears to be a
revival of the isolationist school. With the end of the Cold
War, isolationism is beginning to reassert itself openly as
a powerful political undercurrent. One major difference
compared to that of early times is that "an isolationist
America would not be an isolated America." 37
Although Charles Krauthammer is not an isolationist, he
has stated that he has "great respect for American
isolationism. First, because of its popular appeal and,
second, because of its natural appeal. On the face of it,
isolationism seems the logical, God-given foreign policy for
the United States." 38 The geographical location of being "an
island continent protected by two vast oceans bordered by two"
friendly neighbors, accounts for some of that respect. He
further states that "America was founded on the idea of
cleansing itself of the intrigues and irrationalities, the
dynastic squabbles and religious wars, of the Old World." 39
One writer states that the problem of isolationism is
that it lacks roots in an enduring current, it takes roots in
ad hoc strategies and policies cast in the form of sweeping
principles such as "nonintervention" and "nonentanglement .
"
Isolationism fluctuates in response to given situations and
Tucker, A New Isolationism , 13. Krauthammer, "The
Lonely Superpower," 24.
38 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Forei gn
Affairs , 70, 1, (1991), 27.
Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," 27-28.
14
attitudes of different groups. 40
Nevertheless, part of its continuing attraction for many
Americans may stem from this key feature. Robert Tucker has
written
:
Isolationism is not to be identified with "quitting
the world," something we have never done and will
never do. It is not to be identified with the
absence of all significant relationships but,
rather, with the absence of certain relationships.
As a policy, isolationism is above all generally
characterized by the refusal to enter into alliances
and to undertake military interventions. This was
the essential meaning of an isolationist policy in
the past, and it remains the essential meaning of
an isolationist policy today. 41
Some policy makers fear that a revival of isolationism
would mean the absence of all significant relationships
between America and the other nations of the world. However,
Tucker answered this fear by saying "what they do argue is
that a new isolationism, were it to prevail, would be
characterized by the refusal to maintain certain
relationships, to undertake certain actions, and that this
refusal would in turn eventually jeopardize interests that
even neo-i sol ationists would have to acknowledge as vital." 42
There it is the underlining theme of isolationism, that the
40 Kenneth W. Thompson, "Isolationism and Collective
Security: The Uses and Limits of Two Theories of International
Relations," in Alexander DeConde, ed, Isolationism and
Security , 167-169.
41 Tucker, A New Isolationism , 12.
42 Tucker, A New Isolationism , 24.
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United States will never pursue a policy of genuine
isolationism. Although it will from time to time be very
selective with whom and where it engages.
"A policy of isolationism is still found by many to imply
the absence of all significant relationships between America
and the other nations of the world rather than the absence of
certain relationships. It is this misunderstanding that often
explains the curious insistence of those who favor an
isolationist policy today that they are not isolationists." 43
The risk today is not that America may become
isolationist again, but that America is being isolated. 44
America has lost some of her prestige in the world
environment. Despite being the only superpower now, leader
of the economic world and sometimes the world's policemen,
other nations are beginning to ask America to leave their
countries, such as the Philippines, or sharply reduce the
America presence, as in Europe. Indeed within the next ten
years the American public will see another major change in
Europe, which will be the break-up of NATO as American's know
it today. America may well be sent home, and there would then
be a new alliance made up of European countries only. Thus,
the isolation of America is being strongly influenced by other
nations in the world.
43 Tucker, A New Isolationism , 117.
44 Hami 1 ton Fish Armstrong , " Isol ated America, " Foreign
Affairs , 51, 1, (October 1972), 4.
16
However, America would not become an isolated America.
Nor would an America nominally isolationist, cease to play a
significant role in the world. Indeed, the mere presence of
American power must in itself continue to be a source of
restraint for the world, since "isolationism would afford no
guarantee to others that regardless of how they behaved
American power could be discounted." 45
B. REALISM
"Realism" in international relations summons forth a whole
host of images and concepts. "Power politics," "balance of
power," "anarchy," "the national interest," and "the security
dilemma" are some examples of realism's contribution to
thinking on American foreign policy. 46
The realist believes that "first and foremost we are to
make the world safe for ourselves." 47 They insist that the
essence of realism is ".
. . putting self-interest first. .
. Policy must be guided by interest, . . . and not by
sentiment, ideology, or abstract principles." 48
The realist holds that power is the fundamental factor
45 Tucker, A New Isolationism , 87-88.
46 Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human
Interests," International Studies Quarterly , 25, 2, (June
1981), 204.
47 Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations , 2 7 3.
48 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 19.
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in foreign affairs. 49 This conception reemerged after World
War II largely in response to the emergence of communism and
Soviet power as threats. As President Reagan indicated,
realism posits that "we must start with a clear-eyed
understanding of the world we live in." 50
While many writers believe that realism guides foreign
policy, actually, realism has been the way of legitimating it:
realism's usefulness has been of a rather different kind of
hope. 51 At the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, Secretary
George Shultz had the following to say about realism. "Thus,
realism shows us a world deeply troubled, yet with reason for
hope. There is one necessary condition: The only way we can
enhance and amplify the human potential is by preserving,
defending, and extending those most precious of conditions-
-freedom and peace." 52
Most supporters of realism see it as being "practical"
or "technical" in international relations. Ashley links both
types, practical and technical realism, to Hans Morgenthau.
For Morgenthau, "No study of politics . . . can be
49 Brandon, American Foreign Policy
,
88
William D. Anderson and Sterling J. Kernek, How
'Realistic' is Reagan's Diplomacy?" Political Science
Quarterly , 100, 3, (Fall 1985), 389.
51 Justin Rosenberg, "What's the Matter with Realism?"
Review of International Studies , 16, (1990), 292.
52 George P. Shultz, "U.S. Foreign Policy: Realism and
Progress," Department of State Bulletin , 82, 2068, (November
1982), 3.
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disinterested in the sense that it is able to divorce
knowledge form action"; he adopts the historian's view in
peering over the statesman's shoulder, listening to his
conversations, and trying to anticipate his thoughts. 53
Practical realism "is oriented by a practical cognitive
interest. It sees the aim of knowledge as principally 'the
attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework
of a self-understanding derived from tradition.'" 54 Ashley
further stated that "practical realism stresses the 'uniquely
human' character of its subject matter. Human beings can
converse, remember, know, expect, and attach meaning to
themselves and their circumstances." Yet, "human beings can
also miscommunicate , forget, misunderstand, falsely expect,
and summon forth forgotten experiences in ways that lend novel
layers of meaning to seemingly similar circumstances." 55 This
type of realism strives to analyze history and the past. It
tries to communicate this character in the human being, sort
of to instill it into the consensus mind. In order to bring
about some type of " transhi stori cal normative-practical
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace , (Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1973), 224, 23, 5, as cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and
Human Interests," 209-210.
Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests,"
210.





On the other side, there is the technical realism that
Ashley spoke of. Once again he relates technical realism in
the words of Hans Morgenthau. Hans Morgenthau wrote
"politics, like society in general, is governed by objective
laws'. . . who invokes a prior theoretical framework of
'interest defined as power'; and who values this framework
because it 'imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer,
infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics,
and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics
possible.'" 57 Ashley writes that "all realists are technical
realists, at least in part, but it is in the so-called 'modern
realism' of Kenneth Waltz that technical realism finds its
starkest approval." 58 Waltz's aspect of technical realism is
indicated in the meaning of theory. Waltz put it this way:
"By a theory the significance of the observed is made
manifest. A theory arranges phenomena so that they are seen
as mutually dependent; it connects otherwise disparate facts:
it shows how changes in some phenomena necessarily entail
56 Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests,
211 .
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations , 4-5, as cited
in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 210.
58 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics .
( Addison-Wesley , Reading, MA, 1979), as cited in Ashley,
"Political Realism and Human Interests," 215.
20
changes in others." 59
Realism has been strong since the 1950s in American
foreign policy, because of the superpower status of the United
States, and the bipolar world confronting America. The end
of the Cold War has not meant the end of realism. Rather the
"ends" of realism have been redefined. Krauthammer holds that
realism is "back," due to the writings by people such as
Tucker, Kennan, Tonelson and Layne, each of whom offered their
own version or concept of realism. However, this time realism
is exclusively concerned with American national interests, not
with ideological ends or liberal internationalism. 60
Charles Krauthammer has pointed to a problem when
national interest is the guiding principle behind U.S. foreign
policy. He claims that somewhere along the line there must
be more meaning than just national interest. He says "when
that is done, one of three things results: (1) if it is
defined strictly, the definition must be so narrow as to lead
directly to (often acknowledged) isolationism; (2) if it is
defined crudely and arbitrarily as a kind of synonym for ad
hoc pragmatism, it is no foreign policy guide at all; (3) if
it is defined expansively, it leads to a foreign policy little
different in practice from the neo- i nternatnonal i sm it
Waltz, Theory of International Politics
,
9-10, as
cited in Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," 215.
60 Charles Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," The
New Republ ic , (February 17, 1986), 15.
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purports to critique." 61
President Reagan stated that Americans must begin with
a renewed realism, "a clear eyed understanding of the world
we live in and of our inescapable global responsibilities."
Realist see the world as it is, not as American's wish for it
to be. For realists, America must face up to certain
challenges of the future as well as every opportunity that
comes by the way of the United States. 62
C. IDEALISM
Woodrow Wilson made the following ringing statement of
idealism for the League of Nations, in 1919. He said:
To the people of the world, 'Come to us; this is the
home of liberty; this is the place where mankind can
learn how to govern their own affairs and straighten
out their own difficulties,' and the world did come
to us. They saw this star in the west rising over
the peoples of the world and they said, 'That is the
star of hope and the star of salvation. We will set
our footsteps towards the west and join that great
body of men whom God has blessed with the vision of
liberty.' And, believe me, my fellow countrymen,
the only people in the world who are going to reap
the harvest of the future are the people who can
entertain ideals, who can follow ideals to the
death. 63
In the book Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's
61 Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 16
62 Ronald Reagan, United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs, Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key
Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration ,
(Washington, D.C., May, 1984), 1 and 11.
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 408.
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Desti ny , Joshua Muravchik describes the difference between
two groups of idealists. He refers to one group as
"democratic idealists" and the other as "pacifist idealists."
Both forms of idealism agree that moral considerations should
govern foreign policy, but the kinship ends there. In the
past, "democratic idealism has been associated frequently with
America's wars, while pacifist idealism has often manifested
itself in antiwar movements." 64
For the most part pacifist idealism has been associated
with certain groups and their religious convictions.
Furthermore, the pacifist idealists in America's history has
also made it possible for America to be the pioneer in the
sphere of international organizations. 65
In addition, pacifist idealists believe that peace should
be maintained between governments as they currently are, and
any attempt to change that structure is destabi 1 i 1 i zi ng to the
government. The democratic idealists also believe that peace




Examining America's historical background, "it seems fair
to say that the Founding Fathers joined the ingredients of
idealism and self-interest more successfully than have their








descendants." 67 Idealism tends to be characterized by
solutions which are the products of aspirations, not analysis.
The best way to define idealism is to look at the
most commonly professed ideals such as honesty,
truthfulness, fidelity to obi i gation , kindness, fair
play, lawfulness, and nonintervention in other
people's affairs. By noting that these ideals are
ethical restraints upon egoism which operate through
force of conscience, custom, or law, the meaning of
the term and its significance become clearer. If
one then includes the allegiance to a universal
goal, that is some state of affairs believed to be
of benefit to all mankind (such as peace, goodwill,
justice among nations, freedoms, and a decent
standard of living for all), the definition of
idealism becomes complete. 68
At President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, in 1961, he
invoked the idealist concept in American political thought.
Kennedy made the following call to the nation and to the
world, when he said: "Let every nation know, . . . that we
shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship,
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and
the success of liberty. This much we pledge-and more. . . .
United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative
ventures. Divided, there is little we can do— for we dare not
meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder." 69
President Reagan also invoked idealism when he stated that
67 Brandon, American Foreign Policy , 17.
68 Michael D. Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in The
Implementation of Foreign Policy - The Arms Trade: A Source
of Conflict," (MA Thesis, Oriel College, 1975), 2.
69 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 604.
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"idealism and fair play are the core of our system and our
strength 70 Neither president based his foreign policy in
idealism alone. Simply, idealism in foreign policy lacks an
awareness of "power" in international relations. Robert




Idealists. . ., who seek to spread liberty,
equal opportunity, and material progress throughout
the world, will find that these worthy objects
depend, first of all, upon the survival of the
United States and its allies; and realizing this,
they will be forced to put the exigencies of power
politics ahead of their moral sensibilities.
Similarly, if they want to pursue their ideals
effectively, they must base American aid to foreign
peoples primarily upon the power advantage of the
United States and only secondarily upon humanitarian
considerations. They must, at times, support
reactionary and antidemocratic regimes with arms and
money. They must even put themselves in the
position of resisting with force the misguided
proponents of a social revolution, which arises, in
large part, form basic human aspirations which the
American mission itself claims to fulfill. 71
At times it may appear that idealists compromise their stand
on an issue when faced with threats of such magnitude as
fascism and communism. But, for many idealists in reality
idealism is just taking a step back to regroup in order to hit
the opposition head on.
Realists have directly challenged the premises of
70 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presi dents , 748.
71 Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations
. 438, as cited in Haskins, "Realism Versus
Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 11-12.
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idealism. Thus, Charles Krauthammer holds that "idealism in
foreign policy is moral ism misplaced and dangerous. That such
ideal ism--a mix of universal ism, sentimental i sm, and
ideological utopianism— has characterized American foreign
policy since its emergence from 19th-century and, later,
interwar isolationism." 72
Robert Osgood states that self-interested ends are the
most compelling national ends. He holds that survival and the
national self-interest goals are compatible in the idealistic
end of this idealistic world. Osgood also states that the
instability of idealism can be attributed to the
incompatibility of the fundamental ideals and the most basic
national interests. 73
Reflecting the interplay of idealism and realism in
American foreign policy, President Reagan stated that "all
Americans share two great goals for foreign policy: a safer
world and a world in which individual rights can be respected
and precious values may flourish. These goals are at the
heart of America's traditional idealism and our aspirations
for world peace. Yet, while cherished by us, they do not
belong exclusively to us. They're not 'made in America.'
They're shared by people everywhere." 74
72 Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 14
Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations , 1 7
.
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The idealism school of thought continually surfaces over
the course of America's history. That is why idealism remains
a strong force in the American foreign policy. 75
D. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
Specific events in the twentieth century have triggered
either isolationism, realism or idealism. All three are
enduring currents in American foreign policy that have always
been present. The particular school that was triggered in
response to events was dependent upon the threat or situation
that was present. For example isolationism was stronger in
the interwar years following the first World War. Realism
took the lead after the second World War and during the cold
war. Last idealism has been interjected in both time periods
as the opportunity arose.
To illustrate this point, this summary and assessment
will briefly examine the threat of communism that occurred in
the twentieth century. At the end of the first World War,
communism triumphed in the Soviet Union. From a secure base
in the USSR and drawing upon local conditions, the power of
communism continued to build throughout the twenties and
thi rties
.
America wi thdrew to an isolationist state. This was best
exemplified by America's "refusal to join the League of




Nations." 76 The isolationism of the twenties and thirties
continued until America entered the second World War. During
the second World War realism ruled America foreign policy.
America was at war and the mission was to win and bring peace
back into the world.
Krauthammer stated that "after World War II the United
States became the dominant power in the world and
internationalism became the guiding ideology of its foreign
policy." 77 At the end of the war, America followed its
normal pattern of bringing troops home, demobilizing forces
and reducing the military down to a skeleton position. 78
Nevertheless, "World War II discredited . . . isolationism
long enough to bring to prominence a new generation of
Americans who had been born just before or during World War
I and who were much influenced by the bankruptcy of interwar
isolationism." 79 America could have easily stepped back into
a state of isolationism after the war had it not been for
actions of America's adversary; the Soviet Union. The threat
of communism and nuclear rivalry kept America out of
isolationism and continued America's World War II realism.
76 Bernard H. Zaffern, "Isolationism--The Second Time
Around?" (Essay, Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1972), 2.
Charles Krauthammer , "Isolationism, Left and Ri ght, "
The New Republ ic
.
(March 4, 1985), 18.
78 Zaffern, "Isolationism," 9.
John C. Chalberg, "George Kennan: Realist as
Moralist," Reviews in American History , 17, 3, (September
1989), 485.
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With the start of the Cold War, American policy-makers
knew that they had inherited something more than just a new
policy prescription. Kennan stated that "... Utopian in
expectations, legalistic in concept, moralistic in the demands
it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree
of hi gh-mi ndedness and rectitude ... to ourselves." 80
After forty-five years of stark confrontation between
communism in the Soviet Union and democracy in the United
States, the Cold War is over. America won the Cold War.
Victory in the Cold War reflects the triumphs of the
techniques of realism and the goals of idealism in American
foreign policy. As one astute observer has remark, "not on
the strength of its arms or the skill of its diplomats, but
by virtue of the power of the democratic ideas on which the
American system is based and the failure of the Communist
idea." 81 It has been said, with the Cold War over, that if
America can spread democracy to the majority of humankind,
then the twenty-first century will become the true American
century , 82
Muravchik cautions that "as the Communist threat recedes,
the currents of realism and isolationism are sure to gather
strength on the conservative side of the political
80 George Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963
, (1972), 70-71,
as cited in Chalberg, "George Kennan," 483.
81 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 1.
82 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 10.
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spectrum." 83 Nevertheless, if realism and isolationism grow
in strength, then idealism will grow in strength also.
"Realism is not isolationism, but can be and seems
increasingly drawn to it." 84 They are two totally separate
entities. Although many policy-makers believe that realism
is identified with power politics only, today the "new
realists seem less inclined toward the notion of 'interest
defined as power' or to practice of bal ance-of-power
pol i tics . " 85
The question of realism versus idealism is often regarded
as a philosophical argument which is not clearly applicable
in today's complex decision-making process of foreign
policy. 86 Realism "is often characterized as marking the end
of the Utopian stage of human thinking as it places its
emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of
their causes and consequences. Thus while idealism
concentrates on aspirations, realism focuses on the acceptance
of facts, especially in a political context, on the nature and
effects of power." 87
However, most realists are aware of the integration
83 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 48.
84 Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 22.
Krauthammer, "The Poverty of Realism," 22.
86 Michael D. Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in The
Implementation of Foreign Policy," 1.
87 Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the
Implementation of Foreign Policy," 2.
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between realism and idealism, and that "there are valid
arguments for maintaining the vitality of a country's
ideals." 88 This interaction between realism and idealism may
create a situation where a nation may have to sacrifice its
short-run ideals in order to achieve them in the long-run. 89
America's ultimate victory in the Cold War provides a critical
example of the trade-offs between short-run tactics and long-
run ideals.
Osgood superbly states the importance of idealism and
realism in foreign policy when he says:
In its broadest aspect, the interdependence of
universal ideals and national self-interest is
simply a reflection of the fact that man has a moral
sense as well as an ego and that both parts demand
satisfaction. For this reason the most compelling
national ends are those self-interested ends, like
survival, which are most easily reconciled with
idealistic ends, and those idealistic ends, like
the minimum standards of international decency,
which are most compatible with national self-
interest. By the same token the instability of
self-assertive egoism and altruistic idealism can
be attributed, in large part, to the incompatibility
of the former with fundamental ideals and of the
latter with the most basic national interests. 90
Therefore, it can be concluded that this interdependence,
along with confrontation "between realism and idealism does
88 Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the
Implementation of Foreign Policy," 6.
89 Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the
Implementation of Foreign Policy," 7.
Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's
Foreign Relations
, 17, as cited in Haskins, "Realism Versus
Idealism in the Implementation of Foreign Policy," 7-8.
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exist and is not simply a theoretical concept." Policy-
makers are aware of the existing battle, and consequently many
work to ensure that the "expression of divergent views at all
levels" does not "prevent the sacrificing of ideals by
bureaucratic rule." Nonetheless, in spite of all their
efforts, "the balance is practically always tipped in favor
of the realists." Yet when idealists expressed their views,




America is at a crossroad in history, what happens from
here depends on which school predominates. Which school of
thought will America's policy-makers lean toward the most?
As this chapter has tried to point out all three schools of
thought are equally important. They all have had there
moments in American foreign policy. Furthermore, because the
schools are enduring currents in American foreign policy, they
will continue to influence America's policy-makers.
The next chapter examines the impact of morality on
foreign policy issues, and how this interaction relates to the
evolution of American thought. The chapter attempts to
accomplish this by examining issues of morality in general,
the moral dilemma of nuclear strategy, and the Just War
theory. In particular its focus is to determine how each of
these issues impact the overall ideals of Washington's New
91 Haskins, "Realism Versus Idealism in the




III. MORALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
A. MORALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY
Morality has been a constant force shaping the United
States. In their private lives, Americans place priority on
moral values. In the public realm the United States was
founded on a principle of morally good for all, and within
this principle America attempts to give its people a better
way of 1 i fe
.
This section of the thesis will focus on the links policy
writers and presidents have sought to establish between
morality and foreign policy. As a specific illustration of
dilemmas for policy makers, this chapter also examines
morality and nuclear war and the idealism between the theory
of just wars and needed war.
A critical question is, "what is the impact of morality
in American foreign policy?" and how do the three schools
address moral issues in international relations. Morality in
foreign policy does not mean preaching one's religious views
to another. George Kennan said, "Let us face it: in most
international differences elements of right or wrong,
comparable to those which prevail in personal relationships,
are— if they exist at all—simply not discernible to the
outsider. . . . Morality, then, as the channel to individual
self-fulfillment-yes. Morality in governmental method, as a
matter of conscience and preference on the part of our people-
-yes. But morality as a general criterion for measuring and
34
comparing the behavior of different states--no . " 92 It does
mean, however, a way of being able to agree on how to operate
this country. What is morally right for one person may not
be morally right for another. Yet, people have to live, work,
and play together in this country and within the world.
American's are a "moral people." 93 The very foundation
of this country claims that fact. Furthermore, the very
foundation of our American foreign policy will be governed by
moral precepts. 94 "Morality in foreign policy, consists not
in preaching one's values to lesser breeds but in living up
to them oneself. The moral force of any foreign policy
derives from the moral vitality of the national community, and
the test of that vitality lies in the character of policies
at home . " 95
Many writers feel that moral standards are simply
"cultural artifacts" which people need in order to survive
the stresses of this life. But, without these standards
Americans would not be able to handle the everyday toll that
Paul Seabury, "The Moral Purposes and Philosophical
Bases of American Foreign Policy," ORBIS , 20, 1, (Spring
1976), 5.
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 560.
94 Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," 859
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American
History , (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts,
1986), 81.
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life takes on people. 96 Similarly, without a moral anchor a
nation cannot use its foreign policy as a focus around which
others will freely choose to gather.
When looking at issues of morality in foreign policy one
cannot overlook the great works of George Kennan. Kennan
wrote several articles on morality and foreign policy. He was
a realist, who at the same time, had an idealistic look on
foreign policy. Kennan wrote that:
First of all, the conduct of diplomacy is the
responsibility of governments. . . . This
responsibility is not diminished by the fact that
government, in formulating foreign policy, may
choose to be influenced by private opinion. What
we are talking about, . . . when we attempt to
relate moral considerations to foreign policy, is
the behavior of governments, .... Second, let us
recognize that the functions, commitments and moral
obligations of governments are not the same as those
of the individual. Government is an agent, not a
principal. Its primary obligation is to the
interests of the national society it represents, .
Finally, let us note that there are no
internationally accepted standards of morality to
which the U.S. Government could appeal if it wished
to act in the name of moral principles. . . . When
we talk about the application of moral standards to
foreign policy, ... we are not talking about
compliance with some clear and generally accepted
international code of behavior. If the policies
and actions of the U.S. government are to be made
to conform to moral standards, those standards are
going to have to be America's own, founded on
traditional American principles of justice and
propriety. When others fail to conform to those
principles, and when their failure to conform has
an adverse effect on American interests, as distinct
from political tastes, we have every right to
complain and ... to take retaliatory action. What
we cannot do is to assume that our moral standards
Geoffrey Vickers, "The Future of Morality," Futures
.
11, 5, (October 1979) , 382.
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are theirs as well, and to appeal to those standards
as the source of our grievances. 97
George Kennan further stated that the United States will
follow a foreign policy shaped by moral principles. 98 These
principles will be the driving force behind American foreign
pol icy .
"
It is claimed by some policymakers that morality has
nothing to do with the vital interests of America's foreign
policy, but at the same time they hold that "morality is an
aspect of foreign policy" 100 Others believe that "morality is
the best policy" in foreign affairs, because it gives a nation
the opportunity to promote its national interest via their
moral preferences. 101
These differences stem from the reason the "morality and
foreign policy" controversy remains an enduring issue in the
American political arena. It has to do with the very nature
of what America stands for. "Unlike other nations, which are
based on the realities of tribe, race, ethnicity, or language,
George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs
. 64, 2, (Winter 1985/86), 205-208.
98 Muravchik, Exporting Democracy , 21.
Eugen Loebl , "Moral Values and U.S. Policy: An End
to the Age of Hypocrisy?" Strategic Review , 14, 2, (Spring
1986), 32.
100 Kenneth W. Thompson, "Moral Reasoning in American
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the United States is a country whose casements rest on an
idea." 102 The unity of America is based on the unity of an
ideal. Projection that ideal abroad serves to strengthen it
at home.
Many writers suggest several ways in which morality can
enter into the American foreign policy arena. Thus, Bennett
and Seifest hold that first, morality "should determine the
fundamental motives and attitudes of citizens and
policymakers. . . . The second way in which morality should
influence policy is in the criteria that determine immediate
and long-range objectives. . . . The third way in which
morality should influence policy is that nations should accept
moral limits on the means that they will use. George Kennan,
. . . says that 'we should conduct ourselves at all times in
such a way as to satisfy our own ideas of morality.'" 103
Still, other writers argue that moral principles in
foreign policy should apply and have "an identity between the
morality of individuals and the morality of states." 104
Although Arthur Schlesinger feels that this function would be
102 George Weigel, "Exorcising Wilson's Ghost: Morality
and Foreign Policy in America's Third Century," The Washington
Quarterly , 10, 4, (Autumn 1987), 31.
103 John C. Bennett and Harvey Seifert, U.S. Foreign
Policy and Christian Ethics
.
(The Westminster Press,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1977), 29-30.
104 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "National Interests and
Moral Absolutes," in Ernest W. Lefever, ed . , Ethics and World
Politics: Four Perspectives , (Johns Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore, Maryland, 1972), 22.
38
hard to accomplish, nevertheless, he further says that "moral
judgment is possible and necessary" in the foreign affairs
105arena. U3
Even the arch realist, Hans Morgenthau, stated that
".
. . the rule of morality in this respect is not precisely
the same between nations as between individuals. The duty of
making its own welfare the guide of its actions, is much
stronger upon the former than upon the latter; in proportion
to the greater magnitude and importance of national compared
with individual happiness, and to the greater permanency of
the effects of national than of individual conduct." 106
Morgenthau went on to say, "universal moral principles cannot
be applied to states in their abstract formulation, but . .
. must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time
and place." 107 Far from denying morality, Morgenthau's key
point seems to be that one nation cannot just apply its moral
principles to another nation anytime it wishes to make it
happen. Context, opportunity and timing are critical when a
nation seeks to shape the moral bases of another.
It has been said that moral principles enter most
105 Schlesinger, "National Interests and Moral
Absol utes , " 22 .
106 Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Founding Fathers and
Foreign Policy: Implications for the Late Twentieth Century,"
ORBIS, 20, 1, (Spring 1976), 21.
Robert H. Johnson, "Misguided Morality: Ethics and
the Reagan Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly , 105, 3,
(Fall 1980), 513.
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effectively into foreign policy through the idea of national
interest. Morality is not designed to supply the function of
foreign policy, but rather, to "clarify and civilize
conceptions of national interest."
Morality in foreign policy lends itself to some very hard
decisions. First, several issues in foreign policy will not
fit into the moral criteria. Second, governments must make
decisions at different levels than what is required of
individuals. Third, morality is not based upon an
international moral consensus, but upon an individual nation's
consensus and perception. 108
However, moral judgment involves living with some degree
of uncertainty. Especially, because of the uncertainty it
takes, moral judgment can sometimes lead to greater
understanding and more responsible behavior. 109 As a result,
people may never know the effect of their actions. On the
other hand, moral judgment teaches that people and governments
learn to accept the consequences of their actions, even the
ones that they can not fix. 110
In February 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz stated
that, "America also has a moral responsibility. The lesson
108 Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History . 73.
103 Ernest W. Lefever, "Morality Versus Moral ism in
Foreign Policy," in Ernest W. Lefever, ed., Ethics and World
Pol i tics , 1
.
Kenneth W. Thompson, "American Foreign Policy:
Values Renewed or Discovered," ORBIS, 20, 1, (Spring 1976),
133.
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of the postwar era is that America must be the leader of the
free world; there is no one else to take our place. The
nature and extent of our support—whether moral support or
something more— necessarily varies from case to case. But
there should be no doubt where our sympathies lie." 111 Henry
Kissinger, also saw the utility of morality in the formation
of America's winning Cold War coalition. As he stated, "our
goal should be to build a moral consensus which can make a
pluralistic world creative rather than destructive." 112
Morality in American foreign policy should consider what
is best for the "American way of life." However, "in an
imperfect world, few opportunities for morally pure actions
arise for leaders." These leaders should not "pretend that
interests and values will" correspond when they are forced to
make bad decisions. 113
Many of the great writings that relate to morality in
foreign policy were presented and articulated by the
Presidents of the United States. It would appear that these
leaders insisted on setting a standard or guide for the
actions of the United States and others. Several examples may
serve to illustrate the critical role played by leading
Presidents
.
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"Jefferson's claim was, of course, a moral claim. Its
impact on U.S. foreign policy, for better and for worse and
often for both, derives from its universality. The Founding
Fathers did not pledge their 'lives, fortunes, and sacred
honor' to a narrow claim, but to a simple, flat, universal
claim: All men are created equal." 114
President Wilson stated: "A steadfast concert for peace
can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic
nations. . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and
their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests
of mankind to any narrow interest of their own." 115 Wilson has
been identified as the focal point for the issues of morality
and foreign policy debates in the twentieth century. 116
Wilson delivered the following speech in Philadelphia on
Independence Day in 1917: "My dream is that as the years go
by and the world knows more and more of America it . . . will
turn to America for those moral inspirations which lie at the
basis of all freedom . . . and that America will come into the
full light of day when all shall know that she puts human
rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag
not only of America, but of humanity." 117
Weigel, "Exorcising Wilson's Ghost," 32.
115 Seabury, "Realism and Idealism," 862.
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Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "morality must and will win
in the end. Our national policy is . . . committed to the
proposition that principles of morality and considerations for
our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace
dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers .
"
118
Dwight D. Eisenhower said that America can "feel this
moral strength because we know that we are not helpless
prisoners of history. We are free men." 119
In Kennedy's famous speech his moral ideas were echoed:
"Let every nation know, . . . that we shall pay any price,
bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose
any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." 120
President Ford stated that "America is morally and
spiritually number one and that will be the force to keep us
moving so that America, and all its people, its government,
will be number one forever." 121 He made this statement right
after the nightmare that America came through with the Vietnam
War.
Finally, as President Reagan indicated: ". . . There is
a great spiritual awakening in America, a renewal of the
118 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 509.
119 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presi dents , 567.
120 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 604.





traditional values that have been the bedrock of America's
goodness and greatness. . . . America is in the midst of a
spiritual awakening and moral renewal. . . . We will never
give way our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in
God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace." 122
Arthur Schlesinger holds that the greatest American
Presidents in the twentieth century were Woodrow Wilson,
Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, because of their
ability to motivate people with their overwhelming influence.
They had earned the right to speak of justice and freedom
abroad, because of their outstanding records at home. 123
However, going one step further, this thesis would add to
Schlesi nger ' s list the names of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan
and tentatively George Bush. Jimmy Carter is submitted,
because of his idealistic concept of human rights and moral
principles. Ronald Reagan should be included because he
believed that America was in a "moral renewal." George Bush
is submitted because he is articulating the concept of the New
World Order, a concept which has features of the enduring
American linkage of idealism - realism.
These illustrations may serve to illustrate that America
believes that foreign policy should reflect amoral framework.
Even convinced realists have sought to use "power" abroad to
122 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 758-759.
123 Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History , 81.
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fulfill a moral agenda at home. Thus, Hans Morgenthau stated:
"the purpose of foreign policy is not to bring enlightment or
happiness to the rest of the world but to take care of the
life, liberty and happiness of the American people." 124
Secretary of State George Shultz stated that "Americans,
being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the
values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being a
practical people, also want their foreign policy to be
effective. If we truly care about our values, we must be
prepared to defend them and advance them. Thus we as a nation
are perpetually asking ourselves how to reconcile our morality
and our practical sense, how to pursue noble goals in a
complex and imperfect world, how to relate our strength to our
purposes." 125 Nowhere has this critical imperative been more
evident than in the formulation of America's nuclear strategy.
B. THE MORAL DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
The U.S. Catholic Bishops letter, The Challenge of Peace:
God's Promise and Our Response , was an provocative piece of
work on nuclear warfare. They based their position on the
teaching of the Catholic church and their principle of
conscience teaching. The bishops strongly condemned all
Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Ethical Dimensions of
Diplomacy," The Review of Politics
, 43, 3, (July 1984), 377-
380.
George Shultz, United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs, Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key
Foreign Policy Stateme nts of the Reagan Administration
,
(Washington, D.C., May 1984), 7.
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operational use of nuclear weapons and planning for any kind
of nuclear war. More controversially, the bishop's declared
that all operational use of nuclear weapons must be avoided,
even at the price of surrender.
In this pastoral letter, the bishops' arguments point out
moral difficulties associated with the use of nuclear weapons
for deterrence only, but accept nuclear deterrence in
"strictly conditioned" circumstances. 126 "Our threat to fight
back will dissuade an opponent only if he thinks we are able
and if necessary willing to fight back . . . " 127
This section will attempt to explore several moral and
ethical issues related to Nuclear Strategy. The most salient
topics are deterrence, war, and disarmament.
1 . Nuclear Deterrence
The U.S. Bishops' letter acknowledges that every
nation has a right and duty to defend itself against
aggression. They strive to place conditional moral limits on
the concept of deterrence, without making specific moral
judgment on deterrence. The letter acknowledges that
possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent can be morally
Malham M. Wakin, War, Morality, and the Military
Profession (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1986), 463.
127 Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other
Strategists On the Bombing of Innocents," Commentary , (June





Caspar Weinberger held that, "Deterrence remains the
cornerstone of our defense policy. We continue to seek
nuclear and conventional capabilities sufficient to convince
any potential aggressor that the costs of aggression would
exceed any potential gains that he might achieve." 129 The
bishops stated "that essentially, deterrence means dissuasion
of a potential adversary from initiating an attack or
conflict, often by the threat of unacceptable retaliatory
damage . " 13 °
Several mainline churches have rejected nuclear use under
any circumstances. For example, the United Methodist Bishops
rejected the very basis of U.S. nuclear policy, such as
deterrence, by labeling it "idolatry" and stated that ". . .
deterrence must not receive the churches' blessing even as a
temporary warrant for holding on to nuclear weapons." 131
Churches representing almost half of the American population
128 Don B. Ginder, and Irvin Hicks, "On Peace and War:
A Study of Morality and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Politics,"
(Essay, Army War College, Pennsylvania, 1983), 9.
LeRoy F. Foreman, "A Just War In The Nuclear Age:
The Implications of the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral
Letter on War and Peace," (Essay, National War College, 1984),
16.
National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The
Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response
,
(Washington, D.C., United States Catholic Conference Office
of Publishing and Promotion and Services, May, 1983), 163.
131 Keith B. Payne, and Jill Coleman, "Christian Nuclear
Pacifism and Just War Theory: Are They Compatible?"
Comparative Strategy
. 7, 1, (1988), 75.
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have either rejected outright or called into question the U.S.
deterrence program, they felt that the use of nuclear force
under any circumstances is a serious development. 132
Unfortunately, solutions to the issues of nuclear
deterrence and to nuclear use have severe problems. The first
problem is implicit U.S. nuclear disarmament. The second
problem is that the policy proposed by Christian nuclear
pacifists amounts to basing U.S. deterrence policy on a big
bluff. 133
The moral and political paradox posed by deterrence was
concisely stated by Vatican II:
Undoubtedly, armaments are not amassed merely for
use in wartime. Since the defensive strength of any
nation is thought to depend on its capacity for
immediate retaliation, the stockpiling of arms . .
serves, . as a deterrent to potential
attackers. Many people look upon this as the most
effective way . . . for maintaining some sort of
peace among nations. Whatever one may think . . .
people are convinced that the arms race, ... is
no infallible way of maintain real peace . . .
Rather than eliminate the causes of war, the arms
race serves only to aggravate the position. New
approaches, based on reformed attitudes, will have
to be chosen in order to remove this stumbling
block, to free the earth from its pressing
anxieties, and give back to the world a genuine
peace. 134
Pope John Paul II makes this statement about the morality
132 Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 76.
133 Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 77.
134 The Challenge of Peace , 167.
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of deterrence: "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on
balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on
the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged
morally acceptable." 135
The bishops stated the following three points in response
to the above statement:
First, if nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent
the use of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals
to go beyond this planning for prolonged periods of
repeated nuclear strikes . . . are not acceptable.
They encourage notions that nuclear war can be
engaged in with tolerable human and moral
consequences. . . . Second, if nuclear deterrence
is our goal, "sufficiency" to deter is an adequate
strategy; .... Finally, nuclear deterrence
should be used as a step on the way toward
progressive disarmament. Each proposed addition to
our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine
must be assessed precisely in light of whether it
will render steps toward "progressive disarmament"
more or less likely. 136
For some, the fact that nuclear weapons have not been
used since 1945 means that deterrence has worked, and this
fact satisfies the demands of both the political and the moral
order. This fact that deterrence seems to have worked so well
for forty years says something profound: nuclear pacifism may
be too risky to supplant a tried and tested policy. 137
To abandon deterrence is to neglect the duty to defend
135 The Challenge of Peace , 173.
136 The Challenge of Peace , 188.
Raymond English, ed., Ethics and Nuclear Arms:
European and Ameri ca n Perspectives
,
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the innocent, to preserve the Constitution and the Republic,
and to keep safe the very idea of political liberty. No
President by the virtue of his oath to office can so act, nor
can a moral people of a democratic nation. 138
Nevertheless, the moral critique of deterrence holds that
the actual use of nuclear weapons, even in retaliation, is
never justified. As the bishops put it, one is morally
obliged to "say no to nuclear war." 139
2. Nuclear War
"The moral duty today is to prevent nuclear war from
ever occurring and to protect and preserve those key values
of justice, freedom and independence which are necessary for
personal dignity and national integrity." 140
Many people who are not opposed to war in principle will
call themselves "nuclear pacifists," because they believe that
it can newer be justified to fight a war with nuclear weapons.
Pacifism of this kind has always been the conviction of a
mi nor i ty . 141
It is possible to justify the right to go to war, and to
138 Wakin, War, Morality, and the Military Profession
,
493.
139 Charles Krauthammer, "On Nuclear Morality,"
Commentary , 76, 4, (October 1983), 49.
140 John Langan, "Challenges to The Challenge of Peace
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Quarterl
y
, 11, 3, (Summer 1988), 95.
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morally wage war, provided that certain conditions are met.
To be justified, war must be an instrument of policy: it must
be a means to a desirable and morally defensible goal.
Victory is not a goal which justifies war: to justify a war
a state must be able to bring out the good to be achieved by
victory. 142 The Just War section will address several of the
questions of when it is justified to go to war.
The Methodist pastoral letter states that, "there is no
just cause which can warrant the waging of nuclear war or any
use of nuclear weapons." The Catholic Bishops state that,
"deterrence itself is temporarily acceptable because it serves
to inhibit nuclear war— an evil greater than the mere
possession of nuclear weapons." 143
3. Nuclear Disarmament
Three signs of the times have particularly influenced
the writing of the bishops letter. The first, to quote Pope
John Paul II at the United Nations, is that "the world wants
peace, the world needs peace." The second is the judgment of
Vatican II about the arms race: "The arms race is one of the
greatest curses on the human race and the harm it inflicts
upon the poor is more than can be endured." The third is the
way in which the unique dangers and dynamics of the nuclear
arms race present qualitatively new problems which must be
M. Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence
,
8-9
143 Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 77.
T 1
addressed by fresh applications of traditional moral
pr i nci pi es . 144
4. Summary and Assessment
Weapons in themselves are not evil, but the evil
occurs from the people who use them. These weapons can be
used both for good and evil intentions. The morally accepted
standards occur from the intended use and the purposes of
those who manufacture and deploy them. 145
American leaders are restrained by the moral
sensitivities of the American people. Ultimately, the power
of the U.S. rests not upon technology and weapon systems but
upon the resolution and conviction of the American people.
Clausewitz argued that public support for the policies of the
state are vital for any military success: "One might say that
the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt (of the
sword), while the moral factors are the precious metal, the
real weapon, the finely honed blade."' 146
Henry Kissinger stated: "Morality without security is
ineffectual; securi ty wi thout moral i ty is empty. To establish
the relationship and proportion between these two goals is
perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and
144 The Challenge of Peace , 13.
145 Kenny, The Logic of Deterrence , 14.
Lloyd J. Matthews, and Dale E. Brown, The Parameters
of Military Ethics
,
( Pergamon-Brassey ' s , International Defense
Publishers, Inc., Virginia, 1989), 25.
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our nati on . " 147
Although nuclear deterrence has been subject to
significant conditions from many moralists, no one has come
up with a better solution. In fact, the theory of deterrence
is as old as armed conflict. It means nothing more than doing
those things that will discourage attack by an enemy force.
What moralists dislike about nuclear deterrence is its
implicit threat to actually use the weapons. 148 If the
possession or use of nuclear weapons is in violation of
fundamental religious precepts of morality, then the security
of our nation by endorsing those moral precepts will simply
be considered a burden that must be borne. 149
America has the moral responsibility to protect the
values cf justice, freedom and order in the international
arena. All mankind has the absolute moral right to be
protected. International affairs has a moral responsibility
to avoid nuclear war or nuclear conflict at all costs. The
moral problem of the nuclear age is how to keep the peace and
how to ensure that it is a just peace, one which preserves the
freedom of nations, and their right to development. America
and the world has a moral duty to prevent nuclea r war from
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ever occurring and to protect and preserve those key values
of justice, freedom, and independence which are necessary for
democracy to continue. 150
C. THE JUST WAR THEORY
One of the criteria of the just-war teaching is that there
must be a reasonable hope of success in bringing about justice
and peace. 151 The moral theory of the Just-War doctrine begins
with the presumption which binds all Christians: "We should
do no harm to our neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key
test of whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of
taking even one human life is a prospect we should consider
in fear and trembling." 152
Just war theory provides a rationale for conducting war,
this theory contains two parts, "jus ad bellum" and "jus in
bello." Jus ad bellum addresses the principles concerning
the reasons for war, whereas jus in bello treats the morality
of war, and how the war is fought. 153
Jus ad bellum looks at the conditions which allow a war
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First, Competent Authority: War can only be waged
by properly constituted governments and only in
accordance with the properly constituted laws of the
nation. War cannot be waged by private parties. .
. . The state must be acting within its constitution
and laws. . . . This requirement for war is
particularly important in a democratic society.
Second, Just Cause: To justify the resort to
violence and killing involved in war, there must be
sufficient reason which would outweigh the evil
inherent in the conduct of war. Just cause covers
the following: a) self-defense and assistance to
other nations under attack, b) restoration of rights
wrongfully denied, c) securing peace, punishing
evil-doers, and uplifting the good. In view of the
violence and destruction of modern warfare, any
aggressive form of war is seen to be immoral since
the damage appears to be disproportionate ....
Thus, at the moment, there is a consensus among
moral teachers that the only just cause valid today
is self-defense and assistance to other nations
under attack. Third, Right Intention: The war must
be fought for the intention, either of achieving
some good or avoiding some evil. St. Augustine said:
"We do not seek peace to be at war, but we go to war
that we may have peace." Peace should be the
ultimate objective of war, .... Fourth, Last
resort: War causes such serious harm, that it
should not be entered into unless all reasonable
efforts have been exhausted to resolve the dispute
peacefully.
. . . Fifth, Proportionality: The good
to be achieved or the evil to be avoided must be
proportionate to the cost or harm of the war. . .
. The consensus among churches and theologians is
that basically only wars of self-defense and
assistance to other nations can meet the
proportionality requirement. Sixth, Probability of
Success: It is necessary that there be a probability
of a successful outcome of the war. Finally,
Comparative Justice: This principle emphasizes the
presumption against war which stands at the
beginning of just-war teaching. 154
The jus ad bellum conditions are mere guidelines which can be
followed by government and military leaders as well as private
154 The Challenge of Peace , 85-99. Ginder and Hicks,
On Peace and War," 28-32.
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citizens in assessing the morality of war. The underlying
theory is that human life is important and can only be taken
in war under certain conditions.
When it has been determined that a war is just, the
policymakers, need to look at the morality of the conduct of
the war, in essence the means of war. Jus in bello provides
two basic principles for the consideration of the morality of
military operations, tactics and strategy.
First, Principle of Discrimination: War may not be
conducted in such a manner as to kill civilian
noncombatants . Acts of war must be aimed at the
enemy's military forces. Innocent bystanders should
be immune from direct attack. This principle is
based on limiting the taking of life to only that
which directly threatens. Just war permits the
taking of life, but only in self-defense. Thus the
principle of discrimination establishes the
following prohibitions against killing: a) civilian
noncombatants. b) prisoners of war when they are no
longer a military threat, c) the wounded, since they
are no longer a threat. 155
The principle of discrimination was a concept that was
developed several years ago, when technology was primitive.
Some policymakers believe that modern warfare requires a
reexamination of the concept of civilian noncombatants, since
it involves massive damage and destruction to entire
populations. War is not a respecter of persons and the
conduct of war results in civilian noncombatant casualties.
Basically, this principle holds that civilian noncombatant
casualties are morally acceptable if they are an unintended
Ginder and Hicks, "On Peace and War," 32-33
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result of a morally permissible action against a military
target. 15e
The second principle for assessing the morality of
military strategy, tactics and operations is proportionality.
"This dictates against the excessive use of force by holding
that the amount of force used must be proportional to the goal
to be accomplished and to the mission. . . . The principle of
proportionality is again an attempt to limit the violence,
killing, and damage of war to only that which is directly
related to the war and directly needed to accomplish the war
objecti ve— peace . It is a matter of justice." 157 These
principles are used by several moral thinkers as the basis
against nuclear weapons. The bishops held that nuclear
weapons are destructive, indiscriminate and out of proportion
tc most war objectives. 158
Nuclear pacifists claim the use of nuclear weapons would
be so destructive that it would likely violate Just War
requirements. Moreover, "Christian nuclear pacifists also
object to limited and discriminate nuclear capabilities, as
would appear to be required by Just War considerations,
because they believe such capabilities would 'destabilize'
156
157
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deterrence . " 159
The position of Christian nuclear pacifists is
incoherent, for at least three reasons.
First, there is no reason to place all potential
forms of nuclear use in a special unjust category.
Some very limited and controlled forms of nuclear
use could or in principle, help protect the innocent
from an aggressive invasion .... Second, if we
were to judge the use of force by the United States
as unjust . . . then the United States would truly
be unable to use any means to protect its civilians
from aggression. Third, it is not consistent with
a Christian understanding of moral responsibility
to suggest that the United States, if it attempts
to use force justly, would then be morally
responsible for the possible subsequent unjust use
of force by the Soviet Union. 160
Nuclear warfare nevertheless provides a new challenge to
the just-war teaching and nonviolence principles. This is the
"starting point of any further moral reflection: nuclear
weapons particularly and nuclear warfare as it is planned
today, raise new moral questions." 161
Living in the nuclear age means that the world must
condemn nuclear war, but still be able to live with nuclear
weapons. The just-war theory has evolved, as an effort to
prevent war; if war cannot be avoided, the theory of just-
war then seeks to restrict and reduce its horrors. The theory
Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 83.
160 Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 86.
Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
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accomplishes this by establishing a s< t of rigorous conditions
which must be met if the decision to go to war is to be
morally permissible. 162
The U.S. strategy is to respond to aggression by a
counterattack equal to the intensity appropriate to "terminate
the conflict on terms favorable to the forces of freedom, and
reestablish deterrence at the lowest possible le/el of
violence, thus avoiding further destruction." In the bishops
consideration of limited nuclear war, their ern is not so
much with the principles of proportionality or discrimination
but with the uncontrolled escalation of nuclear war. They
r es- that "the use of one tactical weapon could produce panic,
with completely unpredictable consequences." They consider
the risk of un( ntrolled escalation to< great to justify any
limited use of nuclear weapons, and they place the burden on
those wh< agree by stating: * r e burde» cf proo* "--.ins
oi those '• insist tr a1 meaningful limitation is possible." 183
It is dif^ : jit to examine the implicat of the
concern about uncontrolled escalation because they
fail to state rfhat they consider amorally acceptable standard
c* escalatior control. Since uncontrollable escalation is
likel> to cause disproportionate casualties, it would be
immoral to risi' uncontrollable escalatior because the risk of
Payne ar z Coleman, "Christiar N ear Pacifism ai .
Just War ' " e c ^ y , 82.
~z'^—^. "A J - • I 1' T^e ' . ' -e," 9
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disproportionate casualties is likely to outweigh any military
advantage. In order to determine when a limited nuclear
response is morally permissible, one must first determine the
certainty of control required of an authorizing official. Two
standards of certainty are possible: reasonable probability
and moral certainty. 164
During any discussion of the moral issue surrounding
nuclear weapons, a fundamental principle recited in the
preliminary passages of the pastoral letter must not be
overlooked: "The Christian has no choice but to defend peace,
properly understood, against aggression. This is an
inalienable obligation." 165
Escalation is likely to occur, once nuclear force is
employed, "the results being disproportionate and morally
unacceptable destruction." 166 "It can be concluded from the
previous discussion of technology that nuclear weapons are
becoming increasingly similar to conventional weapons in that
they could, but. . . need not violate the Just War guidelines
of proportionality and discrimination." 167
"If the just use of force is to be considered unjust
because of the potential indiscriminate destruction that an
Foreman, "A Just War In The Nuclear Age," 10.
165 The Challenge of Peace , 73.
Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 78.
Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
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aggressor might inflict, or response then it is not only the
use of nuclear force that the United States must reject, but
. . . the use of any force." 168 The U.S. Catholic bishops "do
not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation
of nuclear war, on however restricted a scale, can be morally
justified. " 169
D. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
Woodrow Wilson made the following statement:
A democracy is peace-loving. It does not like to
go to war. It is slow to rise to provocation. When
it has once been provoked to the point where it must
grasp the sword, it does not easily forgive it's
adversary for having produced this situation. The
fact of the provocation then becomes itself the
issue. Democracy fights in anger--it fights for
the very reason that it was forced to go to war.
It fights to punish the power that was rash enough
and hostile enough to provoke it--to teach that
power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the
thing from happening again. Such a war must be
carried to the bitter end. 170
In this statement President Wilson sumed up the three schools
that this thesis is examining.
First, "a democracy is peace-loving", here one can
identify the school of "idealism." The core of idealism is
to maintain peace, and bring peace to the world. The speading
Payne and Coleman, "Christian Nuclear Pacifism and
Just War Theory," 85.
169 The Challenge of Peace , vii.
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: Expande d
Edition
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of democracy occurs within the scope of this school.
Furthermore, the ideal of peace and democracy lie within the
realm of America's moral values.
Next in Wilson's statement, are three sentences that
refers to going to war. Within these three sentences one can
identify the school of "isolationism." The isolatist does not
like to fight, unless it is for the protection of his own
borders. He seeks to maintain an absence from war and other
foreign entanglements.
The final portion of his statement deals with war and
what happens when America is push beyoud their moral beliefs
of fighting. It is in this portion of the statement that one
can clearly see the school of "realism." Realism deals with
showing America's power and stopping the power of others. The
realist seeks victory at all costs. He tends to slip away
from his moral convictions for a period of time in order to
achieve total victory and show his mighty power.
Every political act or decision involves some sort of
moral responsibility. This is why America must strive for
exemplary moral character. America must be aware of the
impact on her moral character for the political action
taken. 171
America as a nation needs to find the proper way to
honestly confront the moral consequences of national actions.
Theodore R. Weber, "Morality and National Power in
International Politics," The Review of Politics , 26, 1,
(January 1964), 40.
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Americans also need to completely turn themselves from the
thinking and the policy that has degraded the nation's moral
posture. America must recognize that out of conviction and
self-examination can come a genuine rebirth of the ideas
America holds as a people.
As President Reagan declared: "When we speak of peace,
we should not mean just the absence of war. The peace rests
on pillars of freedom, human rights, national self-
determination and respect for the rule of law." 172
The next chapter examines one aspect of what President
Reagan was attempting to say, and that aspect is universal
human rights. It attempts to examine the impact of human
rights and relates human rights to American foreign policy.
172 Loebl , "Moral Values and U.S. Policy," 28
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IV. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The term human rights was introduced to Americans in the
twentieth century, but the idea of human rights in American
foreign policy has been with America from the beginning. It's
origin dates to the Declaration of Independence. America's
Declaration of Independence reads, "We hold these truths to
be self evident: that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
. To protect these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed . " 173
One reason America endorses equal rights stems from the
very diversity of the United States. Thus Americans do not
share a common history, race, language, or religion. Thus
"rights" became the very definition of America. 174
"America did not invent human rights. In a very real
sense it is the other way around. Human rights invented
America. America was the first nation in the history of the
17
' Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and the
Foundations of Democracy," World Affairs
, 144, 3, (Winter
1981-82), 196. She read this statement from the Declaration
of Independence, as she addressed the United Nations.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and American
Foreign Policy: A Symposium," Commentary , 72, 5, (November
1981 ) , 42.
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world to be founded explicitly on such an idea." 175
Based on the American creed, "human rights is a political
idea with moral foundations." 176 It suggests that all
humankind should be guaranteed certain basic rights, and that
governments are responsible to deliver those rights.
Since the turn of this century, human rights issues have
been promoted in American foreign policy on almost every
political platform. It is politics that generated the
movement of human rights and made it the powerful force in the
world that it is today. 177
Thus President Wilson saw the League of Nations, as
central in promoting a new ideal of human rights or equality
for all. As Wilson stated in referring to Germany at the end
of World War I: "We wish her only to accept a place of
equality among the peoples of the world . . . instead of a
place of mastery. ... It is the principle of justice to all
peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal
terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be
strong of weak . " 178
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presi dents , 743.
176 Louis Henkin, "The Universality of the Concept of
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Although the League ultimately failed, thirty years
later, Franklin D. Roosevelt's idea of the United Nations was
closely connected to his vision of Wilson's human rights.
Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that "freedom means the supremacy
of human rights everywhere . " He went on to say that Americans
"are inspired by a faith which goes back through all the years
to the first chapter of the Book of Genesis: 'God created man
in His own image.' We are ... to uphold the doctrine that
all men are equal in the sight of God." 179
This vision was carried forth by President Truman.
Truman stated the following in favor of the United Nations.
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free
from coercion, the United States has taken a leading
part in establishing the United Nations. The United
Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom
and independence for all its members. We shall not
realize our objectives, however, unless we are
willing to help free peoples to maintain their free
institutions and their national integrity against
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on
free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression,
undermine the foundations of international peace
and hence the security of the United States. 180
One reason the United Nations was established was to
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presi dents , 512 and 518. (Emphasis added).
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presi dents , 540.
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promote and encourage respect for human rights everywhere. 181
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
"consists of a Preamble and thirty articles, setting forth the
human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all men and
women, everywhere in the world, are entitled, without any
discrimination. 182 The following is a brief outline as
described by Kirkpatrick.
Article 1, reads: 'All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.' Article
2, which sets out the basic principle of equality
and nondiscrimination as regards the enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, forbids
'distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sect,
language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status.' Article 3, a cornerstone of the
Declaration, proclaims the right to life, liberty,
and security of person. It introduces the series
of articles (4-21) in which the human rights of
every individual are elaborated further. Article
22, the second cornerstone of the Declaration,
introduces Articles 23 to 27, in which economic,
social, and cultural rights. The concluding
articles, Articles 28 to 30, stress that everyone
'is entitled to a social and international order in
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized.' 183
Americans must remember that this charter is only as good as
181 Louis Henkin, "Law and Politics in International
Relations: State and Human Values," Journal of International
Affai rs , 44, 1, (Spring 1990), 194.
182 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Establishing a Viable Human
Rights Policy," World Affairs , 143, 4, (Spring 1981), 330.
183 Kirkpatrick, "Establishing a Viable Human Rights
Pol icy , " 330-331 .
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people of the world are willing to follow it. The charter by
itself is of limited support, it takes governments willing to
support it to make it happen. 184
Dwight D. Eisenhower had enough foresight in the heart
of the Cold War to realize that America's greatest achievement
was to maintain peace among the nations of the world. His
hope was ". . .to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity
among people and among nations. . . . (and that) all people
will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the
binding force of mutual respect and love." 185
John F. Kennedy brought a new kind of style and
imagination to the presidency. At different times Kennedy
could represent both the realism and idealism schools of
thought. He was filled with ideals and morals for America.
In his inaugural address, he made his famous challenge to
".
. .my fellow Americans; ask not what your country can do
for you--ask what you can do for your country. My fellow
citizens of the world; ask not what America will do for you,
but what together we can do for the freedom of man. . . . With
a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final
judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love,
asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on
David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign
Policy: Retrospect and Prospect," Political Science Quarterl
y
,
105, 3, (Fall 1990), 436.
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 594-596.
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earth God's work must truly be our own." 186
In this century, human rights have played a major role
in shaping American foreign policy, and more so since World
War II. 187 For example Wilson's attempt of the League of
Nations, the establishment of the United Nations, and the
central place of human rights in the foreign policy of
President Carter. "The real dialectic behind American foreign
policy has always been our passion for human rights as
universally desirable and our passion to protect the material
fruits of our specifically American experience." 186
Although the phenomenon of human rights is not new to
America, the emphasis given to human rights since the mid-
1970s is new 189 During the Carter Administration, human
rights policy was defined by Cyrus Vance as: "1) the right to
be free from government violation of the integrity of the
person. ... 2) the right to fulfillment of such vital needs
as food, shelter, health care and education. ... 3) the
Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The Ame rican
President s , 60 5.
Paula J. Dobriansky, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign
Policy," The Washington Quarterly , 12, 2, (Spring 1989), 156.
Elizabeth Petersen Spiro, "A Paradigm Shift in
American Foreign Policy," Worldview
, 20, (January/February
1977 ) , 45.
189
153.
Dobriansky, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy,
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right to enjoy political and civil liberties. . . ." 19°
Schlesinger wrote that the Declaration of Independence was
founded on the proclamation of "inalienable" rights, and ever
since human rights have been part of the "American
tradi tion . " 191
It has been said that human rights issues are "possibly
the most tangled web in American foreign policy." 192 As a
result "there is no simple or enduring domestic consensus
behind concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
."' 93 While human rights may be a "tangled web," it appears
from the above that there is indeed an "enduring domestic
consensus behind" the human rights issues. During this
century, virtually every president has tried to establish a
workable human rights policy. As stated with clarity in 1974,
a principal goal of American foreign policy, "is to promote
Law Day Address by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
University of Georgia, April 30, 1977, cited in "Toward an
Integrated Human Ri ghts Pol i cy
,
" monograph (New York: American
Association for the International Commission of Jurists,
1979), 1, as cited by Dobriansky in "Human Rights and U.S.
Forei gn Pol i cy , " 157.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Human Rights and the
American Tradition," Forei gn Af f ai rs , 57, (1978), 503-526, as
cited by Forsythe, "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy," 435.
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to
Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy
,
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 187,
as cited by Forsythe in "Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy,"
450.
193 Sandra Vogelgesang, American Dream, Global
Nightmare: The Dilemma of U.S. Human Rights Policy , (New York:
Norton, 1980), 111-112, as cited by Forsythe in "Human Rights
in U.S. Foreign Policy," 450.
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the increased observance of internationally recognized human
rights. " 194
In retrospect, concerning Carter's human rights policy,
"it is evident that the advocates of placing human rights at
the center of America's foreign policy gave little
consideration to the utility of any specific foreign policy
instruments .... No better cornerstone for a foreign policy
edifice constructed on a foundation of moral absolutes could
be found. Human rights had the advantage of looking like a
positive goal, without the negative connotations associated
with the Cold War containment consensus." 195
In 1376, Henry Kissinger made it clear that any
violations of human rights by a government might be cause for
America to stop providing aid to that nation. Unless it was
"determined that a 'extraordinary circumstances' [existed] to
warrant a continuation." 196
Samuel Huntington holds that other nations have a very
positive attitude toward America because of the conscious
choices of presidents such as Kennedy and Carter. They both
set a very high priority on the promotion of democracy and
Sec. 502B(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, as cited by Aryeh Neier, "Human Rights in
The Reagan Era: Acceptance in Principle," in Richard D.
Lambert, ed, The Annals of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science
. 506, (November 1989), 31.
Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy," 147.
Spiro, "A Paradigm Shift in American Foreign
Pol icy , " 42-43
.
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human rights with the world agenda. 197
Today, human rights are a central part of President
Bush's New World Order. As Bush states, "what makes us
American is our allegiance to an idea that all people
everywhere must be free. This idea is as old and enduring as
this nation itself. . . ," 198
Secretary of State James Baker has said: "I think . .
. human rights ... is one of the very basic foundations of
our foreign policy, and for that matter, our national security
policy .... I don't think that we should distinguish in our
human-rights standards in application between situations where
human rights are violated on the left or situations where
human rights are violated on the right. I think our standards
ought to be straight and we ought to play it down the
middle. " 1"
Thus, human rights issues are "alive and active" in
current American foreign policy. 200 Several reasons have been
offered for the continual vitality of human rights: First,
".
. . human rights had become a major issue on the global
197 Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals versus
American Institutions," Political Science Quarterly , 97, 1,
(Spring 1982) , 31 .
Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," 452.
Neier, "Human Rights in the Reagan Era," 31.
200 Jerome J. Shestack, "Human Rights, The National
Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy," The Annals of The American
Academy of Political and Social Science , 506, (November 1989),
18.
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agenda, .... Second, furtherance of human rights served our
security interests. . . . Third, human rights would further
a just world order. . . . Fourth, . . . there were good
reasons for a strong human rights focus in foreign policy. .
. . Finally, it was in our national interest to have a foreign
policy that commanded popular support because such a foreign
policy would reflect fundamental values of the American
peopl e . " 201
SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT
In the post Cold War world, human rights is bound to play
a major role in American foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick
stated that "... not only should human rights play a central
role in U.S. foreign policy, no U.S. foreign policy can
possibly succeed that does not accord them a central rcle." 202
Another policy writer stated that ". . . concern for
human rights can and should be a component of American foreign
policy. . . . If we are to advance the cause of human rights,
a balance must be struck. While we must continue to speak the
truth about every country which violates human rights, we must
recognize that our influence is limited. The ultimate
guarantors of human rights are the people of a given nation.
Our role must be to make them understand that the United
Shestack, "Human Rights, the National Interest, and
U.S. Foreign Policy," 20-21.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Human Rights and American
Foreign Policy: A Symposium," 42.
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States is on their side." 203
President Carter sought to lay a very strong foundation
in human rights policies around the world. He believed that
a foreign policy based on fundamental values could use power
and influence for humane purposes. Carter "reaffirmed
America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet
of our foreign policy. What draws us together, perhaps more
than anything else is a belief in human freedom
Throughout the world today, there is a preoccupation with the
subject of human freedom, human rights." 204
Nevertheless, there are some policy-makers who feel
"human rights is a confusing foreign policy." 205 For example,
member nations of the United Nations can not agree on
standards of human rights within their individual countries.
Some countries have a strong support for human rights and
others still have a total disregard for their peoples rights.
The future of human rights in the world will depend
largely upon their continued existence and support in American
foreign policy. 206 By continuing to represent the "American
way of Life," and spreading democratic ideals America will be
Bayard Rustin, "Human Rights and American Foreign
Policy: A Symposium," 63.
204 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 720-721.
205 Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy," 148
206 William Barrett, "Human Rights and American Foreign
policy: A Symposium," 26.
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able to exercise its power and demonstrate its total support
for universal human rights. The current waves of
democratization sweeping the Soviet Union/Russia, Eastern
Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa are the
visible fruits of America's long term support of human rights.
Ultimately, the earlier consequences of "isolationism,"
coupled with the tools of "realism" are now yielding
"idealism" core goals of democracy and liberty.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has examined several aspects of American
foreign policy. Its basic theme has been that President
Bush's New World Order reflects enduring currents in American
foreign policy. These currents are reflected in the concerns
expressed by three major schools of thought in American
foreign policy: isolationism, realism and idealism.
During the twentieth century, America has been under
constant change. America has seen two World Wars, two other
major conflicts, the Korean War and Vietnam, and several other
smaller conflicts since the turn of the century. But one
thing has not changed, and that is the motto or foundation of
this great nation, which is "We the People." As this thesis
has attempted to examine several aspects of American foreign
policy, that phrase, "We the People," has been an underlining
theme. That phrase contains several key goals such as
freedom, democracy, peace, strength, morality, and human
rights. The following was once stated about the United
States
.
The United States is not a state like France, China,
England, etc., and it would be a great tragedy if
someday the United States became such a state. What
is the difference? First of all, the United States
is not a national state, but a multinational state.
Second, the United States was founded by people who
valued individual freedom more highly than their own
country. And so the United States is primarily a
state of freedom. And this is what is most
important. Whole peoples from other countries can
say, Our homeland is Germany, Russia, or whatever;
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only Americans can say, My homeland is freedom 207
Chapter I of this thesis includes a partial segment of
President Bush's New World Order speech. The last five
paragraphs of that segment contains the central core and
essence of this thesis. It states:
The new world order does not mean surrendering
our national sovereignty or forteiting our
interests. It refers to new ways of working with
other nations to deter aggression and to achieve
stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to
achieve peace.
It springs from hopes for a world based on a
shared commitment among nations large and small, to
a set of principles that undergird our relations.
Peacefu 1 sett lements of di sputes , so 1 i darity aga inst
aggression , reduced and control led arsenal s , and
just treatment of all peoples.
The new world order really is a tool for
addressing a new world of possibilities. This order
gains its mission and shape not just from shared
interests, but from shared ideals. And the ideals
that have spawned new freedoms throughout the world
have received their boldest and clearest expression
in our great country the United States. Never
before have so many millions drawn hope from the
American idea. And the reason is simple: Unlike
any other nation in the world, as Americans, we
enjoy profound and mysterious bonds of affection
and i deal i sm.
What makes us American is our allegiance to an
idea that all people everywhere must be free. This
idea is as old and enduring as this nation itself.
The new world facing us, is a wonderful world
of discovery. A world devoted to unlocking the
promise of freedom. 208
Samuel P. Huntington, The Dilemma of American Ideals
and Institutions in Foreign Policy
,
(American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1981),
15.
208 Bush, "The Possibility of a New World Order," 451-
452. Italics added.
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Within that speech one can examine the assumption of peace,
democracy, morality, human rights, isolationism, realism and
idealism. Bush's New World Order is not new, but contains
enduring currents that have always been part of American
foreign policy. The power behind the New World Order is in
the American people.
In many ways President Carter's policy foreshadowed
several of the points and principles contained in Bush's New
World Order. Carter's policy consisted of the following
concepts
.
Our policy should be based on close cooperation with
our allies and worldwide respect for human rights,
a reduction in world armaments, and it must always
reflect our own moral values. ... It is a new
world that calls for a new American foreign policy-
-a policy based on constant decency in its values
and on optimism in our historical vision.
Our policy must reflect our belief that the world
can hope for more than simple survival and our
belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental
spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an
international system that will last longer than
secret deals. . . . Our policy is based on an
historical vision of America's role. Our policy is
derived from a larger view of global change. Our
policy is rooted in our moral values, which never
change. Our policy is reinforced by our material
wealth and by our military power. Our policy is
designed to serve mankind. And it is a policy that
I hope will make you proud to be Americans. 209
In a real sense Carter's policy laid the foundation for Bush's
New World Order. Carter had the right ideal for an American
foreign policy, but the timing for him and America was wrong.
209 Podell and Anzovin, Speeches of The American
Presidents , 718-723.
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In today's world, especially with all the changes that have
occurred in the last two years, Carter's policy would probably
have succeeded better. In some ways, President Carter was
ahead of his time. Without the correct timing a policy can
not and will not work. American presidencies are made and
broken by timing.
Americans are willing to change, providing that the
timing for them is there. The concepts of the New World Order
provide that opportunity of change. Now is the time for
America to use its influence to reshape the future of the
wor 1 d
.
Chapter II provided an assessment of the three schools
of thought in American foreign policy. Now, as America begins
a new phase of history, which school of thought will tend to
dominate All three schools of thought have had there moments
in history. And all three schools will continue to influence
America and America's policy-makers.
Chapter III examined the concept of morality and foreign
policy. It also discussed the moral dilemma of nuclear
strategy in foreign policy. Throughout this nation moral
principles and ideals have been the driving force behind
American foreign policy. Since "We the People," moral
principles have shaped America and American foreign policy.
Despite moments in America's history where it appeared that
moral principles lapsed the broad sweep of American history
reaffirms the power of America ideals.
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Today, it is said that "America is in midst of a moral
renewal." Americans are returning to fundamental values.
Those values - the cornerstone of the national spirit -
inevitably find expression in America's foreign policy.
George Shultz stated the following about America's
i nterests
.
The United States of America is not just an
onlooker, .... We are participants and we are
engaged. America is again in a position to have a
major influence over the direction of events--and
the traditional goals and values of the American
people have not changed. We have a duty to help
shape the trends, as they evolve, in accordance with
our ideals and interests, to help construct a new
pattern of international stability that will ensure
peace, prosperity and freedom for coming
generati ons . 21 °
As Shultz stated Americans have a "duty to shape the
world." This thesis has tried to show that America must be
the force behind the re-shaping process, it must take an
active part or role in changing this world. One way that
America will accomplish this is by setting high standards at
home. Returning to America's roots, American renewal flows
from its first principle-a nation built on "the right of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
George Shultz further stated the following:
So, as we head toward the 21st century, it is time
for the democracies to celebrate their system, their
beliefs and their success. We face challenges, but
Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,
705.
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we are well poised to master them. Opinions are
being revised about which system is the wave of the
future. The free nations, if they maintain their
unity and their faith in themselves, have the
advantage—economically, technologically, morally.
History is on freedom's side. 211
Chapter IV examined human rights as it pertains to
foreign policy. This issues brings one back to "the right of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." America did not
always use the term human rights, but American political
thought held all to be equal.
Americans have been echoing the words "Let freedom ring,"
for years. In today's world Americans may finally get a
change to see this freedom come to pass. More nations around
the world are becoming democratic. Americans are seeing
communism die as democracy takes on a new life or rebirth.
In the last two years this aspect of freedom has been
more profound than the past forty-five years. It has been
evident with the break up of Eastern Europe, the break up of
the Soviet power and the sweeping move to democracy around the
wor 1 d
.
Finally, it is fitting to cite President Kennedy from his
New Frontier speech in 1960:
721
Recall with me the words of Isaiah: 'They that wait
upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall
mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and
not be weary.' As we face the coming challenge, we
too, shall wait upon the Lord, and ask that He renew
211 Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,
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our strength. Then shall we be equal to the test.
Then we shall not be weary. And then we shall
prevai 1 . 212
Now is America's time. The New World Order, though it may not
be "new" has come at the right time. With careful leadership
America will be at the forefront of the unfolding changes.
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